We use plant output and input prices to decompose the profit margin into four parts: productivity, demand shocks, mark-ups and input costs. We find that these market fundamentals are important in explaining plant exit. Then, we use cross-sectoral tariff variation, as well as tariff changes within sectors over time, to assess whether the impact of different components of the profit margin on plant exit changed with increased international competition. Our specifications control for macroeconomic shocks and other policy changes by either including: (1) GDP growth and a time-varying reform index incorporating labor market regulation, financial market regulation, taxation and privatizarion, or (2) timeeffects. Greater international competition increases the impact of productivity, and to a lesser extent of other market fundamentals, on plant exits. As a result, we find that changes in market selection due to lower sectoral effective tariffs result in higher average productivity. * We thank Diana Hincapie and Rafael Santos for excellent research assistance,
Introduction
It is clear that an important means by which market economies restructure and innovate, in terms of both product and process innovations, is via entry and exit of establishments. Consistent with that view, in economies like the U.S., the entry and exit process has been identified as an important component of aggregate productivity growth. Aggregate productivity growth is achieved in part by the continuous reallocation of businesses. Low productivity businesses are more likely to exit, contributing to raising aggregate productivity. 1 In developing economies, one somewhat surprising finding is that the pace of establishment and firm turnover is typically not that different from that observed for industrialized economies. 2 Even after controlling for differences in the size and industry distributions across countries, the pace of firm and establishment turnover is roughly similar across countries. This finding is surprising given that one may expect poor market institutions and structure to raise barriers to both entry and exit. Barriers on either margin can, in theory, reduce the pace of firm and establishment turnover. For example, administrative entry costs can lower entry as well as exit since start-ups would be less likely and this would relieve underperforming firms from new competitors that exert exit pressures. While the pace of entry and exit (and more generally output and input reallocation) does not appear to vary as systematically across countries as one might expect, there is increasing evidence that poor market institutions adversely impact the nature of the restructuring and reallocation process. That is, there is evidence that reallocation and restructuring contributes less towards enhancing productivity in economies with poor market institutions. For example, Bartelsman et al. (2006 Bartelsman et al. ( , 2007 show that measures of allocative efficiency vary considerably across countries and within countries over time. In particular, in transition economies over the course of the 1990s the findings show that productivity improved in part because of increases in allocative efficiency. Similarly, in Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004 , 2005 , we find greater flexibility in factor adjustments and improvements in productivity due to increased allocative efficiency. These changes in micro dynamics at the establishment level follow after 1 See, e.g., Baily et al. (1992) , Bartelsman and Doms (2000) , Foster et al. (2001 Foster et al. ( , 2006 , and Olley and Pakes (1996) . These findings do not suggest that reallocation is causal for productivity growth but rather that the process of an economy finding the best ways of doing business involves substantial trial and error with reallocation and turnover. 2 See Bartelsman et al. (2006) and Tybout (2000) .
the introduction of market reforms in Colombia in the early 1990s. These findings are consistent with recent theoretical models showing that poor market institutions (including trade barriers) generate misallocation by introducing idiosyncratic distortions to profitability (see Banerjee and Duflo (2003) , Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) , and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2007) ).
While the findings to date from both transition economies and Colombia suggest that market reforms have improved allocative efficiency as predicted by the theory, there has been less progress relating specific market reforms to the links between reallocation and efficiency. In this paper, we explore a specific link -namely the relation between trade reforms and plant exits. Trade liberalization has been a core component of market reforms in developing economies and, in particular, of economies in Latin America. Trade liberalization could affect plant exits and productivity through a number of channels. First, as Pavcnik (2002) argues, increased international competition may induce incumbent firms to become more productive. Second, Melitz (2003) shows that trade liberalization could force lower productivity firms out of the market, cutting down the lower tail of the productivity distribution. It is this latter channel that we focus on in this paper. 3 One remarkable aspect of trade reform in Colombia is substantial variation across sectors. This between-sector, within country, variation reflects both substantial differences in the changes in tariffs introduced by trade reforms for different sectors, and substantial differences in the distortions to the distribution of surviving plants implied by the initial level of tariffs. This variation in trade reforms across sectors, along with rich longitudinal establishment-level data for the manufacturing sector of Colombia permits us to explore the impact of trade liberalization on establishment exit in Colombia. More especifically, we explore whether increased competition due to trade liberalization in Colombia affected establishment exit, and whether the reduced trade barriers impacted the role of different profit margin fundamentals in determining plant exit in Colombia. In particular, we explore the impact of trade reforms on the role of idiosyncratic (i.e., plant-level) total factor productivity, demand shocks, mark-ups and cost variation. Finally, we explore whether there is an increase in aggregate productivity associated with the increased exit following trade reforms. 3 Even here, as will become clear, there are a number of possible channels for improved market selection from trade liberalization that we explore in our empirical analysis. Trade liberalization can both change the distribution of fundamentals (plant profit margin components) and the way in which fundamentals impact exit. 4 In our earlier work (i.e., Eslava et al. (2006)), we have provided evidence that market fundamentals became more important determinants of plant exit in the 1990s relative to the 1980s in Colombia. The
An important and novel feature of our analysis is the separate measurement of physical productivity (rather than revenue-based productivity), mark-ups and input costs. The measurement of each of these components of the profit margin also permits us to evaluate separately the impact that each of these determinants has on plant exit. We are able to measure separately these sources of variability because the Colombian Manufacturing data has plant-level prices of both inputs and outputs. This is a unique feature of the Colombian data, which is useful for our purposes in several ways. First, we are able to deflate output with plant-specific deflators, leading to a measure of TFP that has been stripped of idiosyncratic demand effects. Our approach contrasts with most of the literature, where the measurement of TFP uses plant-level revenue deflated with a sector-level price index. Given within sector price variability, the standard estimation of TFP confounds high physical efficiency and low prices. Second, we are able to precisely estimate demand shocks at the plant-level due to the availability of plant-level output prices. In our estimation of the demand process, we also permit mark-ups to vary across plants. Consistent with theories of market selection, we find that plants with higher productivity, those facing lower input prices, and those subject to positive demand shocks and with more inelastic demands, are less likely to exit.
Since the Colombian manufacturing plant-level data cover a wide range of manufacturing industries, we can exploit differences in tariffs between industries, as well as within industries over time, to explore the impact of trade reforms on market selection. We find that the impact of some of the profit margin components on plant exits increases as tariffs fall. In particular, we find that the marginal effect of productivity on plant exit increases in sectors with especially large declines in tariffs. In turn, we find that this improved market selection on productivity yields increases in aggregate productivity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 has a brief discussion of theoretical considerations that motivate our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe the market reforms introduced in Colombia during the 1990s. In Section 4, we describe the data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey. In Section 5, we present results on the impact of profit margin components, and the interaction of these market fundamentals with trade reforms on exit probabilities. Section 6 presents the implications for average 1990s were a period of market reforms on many dimensions during the 1990s in Colombia (market reforms included trade, financial market, labor market, privatization, and tax reforms). In contrast to this paper, our earlier work made no attempt to identify the impact of particular reforms on market selection. Moreover, the cross-sectional variation of the regulations was not exploited in the earlier work, while here we rely partly on the variability of tariffs across sectors to identify the effects of the trade reforms on market selection. plant-level productivity. We conclude in Section 7.
Theoretical Considerations
According to selection models of industry dynamics (e.g., Jovanovic (1982) , Hopenhayn (1992) , Ericson and Pakes (1995) ) producers should continue operations if the discounted value of future profits exceeds the opportunity cost of remaining in operation. Recent models (e.g., Melitz (2003) , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , and Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008)) emphasize that there may be many market fundamentals that influence variation in profitability across producers. In this literature, producers with market power make decisions on outputs, inputs, and output prices, given productivity shocks, demand shocks, demand elasticity and input price shocks drawn by the producer from a joint distribution. These models also assume that firms face frictions in the market through entry barriers. Typically, producers are assumed to not know their market fundamentals prior to entry, pay an entry fee and obtain their first draw of their market fundamentals from a joint distribution. The market fundamentals are assumed to evolve stochastically over time and consistent with the recent empirical literature are assumed to be highly persistent processes. Given fixed costs of operating each period, the producer makes a decision on whether or not to stay or exit at each point in time. As derived in the recent literature, the canonical exit decision can be modeled as being given by:
That is, plant j exits if the discounted value of profits is below the fixed cost of operating C jt . Current and future profits, π, (and, in turn, their present discounted value, PDV) are a positive function of demand, D jt and productivity shocks, T F P jt , a positive function of the demand elasticity, ε jt (where the latter is negative so an increase implies an increase in the mark-up) and a decreasing function of input price shocks, P Ijt .
In what follows, we estimate this model of market selection for Colombia. The estimates for the basic model are of interest in their own right since Colombia is unique in having rich data with plant-level measures of each of these fundamentals. Moreover, the 5 See e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Foster et al. (2008) for models that yield exit specifications with this full list of market fundamentals (or plant profit margin components). data permit (with some work) extracting demand shocks and demand elasticities as determinants of plant-level outcomes such as survival. However, our primary purpose is to explore the role of market reforms and, in particular, trade liberalization on the market selection process. The channels through which trade liberalization impacts market selection is, in our view, an open theoretical and empirical question. For example, Melitz (2003) develops a model where trade liberalization impacts market selection through equilibrium wages. As the economy liberalizes, the more productive plants expand by increasing exports and this drives up the equilibrium wage. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) emphasize a different possible channel where trade liberalization increases competition and lowers mark-ups. The lower mark-ups overall imply that the marginal plant in terms of productivity can no longer survive. Another type of channel is suggested by the recent literature on misallocation and productivity (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo (2003) , Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) and Bartelsman et al. (2007) ). In these models, the distortions to markets are characterized as including an idiosyncratic component. In our context, trade barriers potentially yield idiosyncratic distortions as restricted trade (or other market distortions) can yield favorable treatment for some firms and less favorable treatment of other firms (e.g., trade protection biased towards specific sectors or firms). A general insight from this class of models is that in addition to the market fundamentals discussed above these idiosyncratic distortions impact profitability and, in turn, market selection. That is, plant survival becomes less related to its favorable market fundamentals and more related to its relatively favorable idiosyncratic distortion.
Given the many different possible channels of trade liberalization on market selection suggested in the recent theoretical literature, we explore a number of different channels in our empirical analysis with a flexible functional form. Relative to the above model of selection, our empirical strategy is based on an enhanced model of exit which includes idiosyncratic market distortions:
where τ jt represents market distortions for plant j including those from trade barriers. While we are not able to measure the full set of market distortions impacting any given plant, we have a variety of measures that proxy for such distortions including measures that help identify those sets of plants that are likely to have experienced a change in their distortions. A key working hypothesis of our empirical analysis is that the plants in sectors with the largest changes in tariffs are, holding other things equal (e.g. including other reforms), more likely to have seen a reduction in their market distortions. In practice, when we estimate the above specification, as discussed in detail below, we include many controls and we estimate flexible specifications, including both direct and interaction effects to capture the impact of reforms including trade liberalization.
While estimating the above basic and extended models is the focus of our empirical strategy, we note that some of the impact of trade liberalization on market selection is hypothesized to work through equilibrium channels. Identifying the changing selection patterns due to say changes in equilibrium wages is a challenge empirically given the many factors impacting equilibrium wages. However, our data and empirical strategy do enable us to explore the impact of trade liberalization on mark-ups and this is part of the empirical analysis below. In addition to examining the impact of trade liberalization on the distribution of profit margin components, we assess whether, for a given distribution of these fundamentals, trade liberalization changes the impact of fundamentals on plant exit.
Trade Reforms in Colombia
Colombia underwent substantial changes in trade policy during the past three decades. After considerable trade liberalization in the 1970s, the administration of president Belisario Betancur implemented a reversal towards protection during the early 1980s in response to the appreciation of the exchange rate, which had contributed to increased foreign competition. Betancurt's policies increased the average tariff level to 27 percent in 1984, but the degree of protection across industries was far from uniform. Manufacturing sectors benefited the most from increased protection as the average tariff in manufacturing rose to 50 percent. However, even within manufacturing some sectors received more protection than others. The sector with the highest protection was textiles and apparel, which had nominal tariffs of nearly 90 percent, and wood products followed with a nominal tariff of 60 percent. These two sectors also had the highest levels of protection through non-tariff barriers.
While barriers to trade were reduced in the second half of the 1980s, trade was largely liberalized in Colombia during the first half of the 1990s. Figure 1 shows average effective tariffs and the standard deviation of effective tariffs starting in 1984. 6 From 6 The effective tariff for a given final good adjusts the nominal tariff levied to the good itself, by this initial level, the figure shows a substantial decline both in average effective tariffs and the dispersion of these tariffs in 1985. The figure then shows a gradual decrease in tariffs which started during the administration of president Virgilio Barco in the late 1980s.
In 1990, the administration of president Cesar Gaviria introduced a comprehensive reform package, which included measures to modernize the state and liberalize markets. Reforms during the 1990s occurred in the areas of trade, financial and labor markets, privatization and the tax system. Probably the most important of all these reforms was the trade reform carried out at the beginning of the 1990s.
The average nominal tariff declined from 27 to about 10 percent overall, and from 50 to 13 percent in manufacturing, between 1984 and 1998. In particular, there was a drastic drop in average effective tariffs and in the dispersion of effective tariffs between 1990 and 1992 during the Gaviria administration. By 1992, the average effective tariff was at 26.6% compared to 62.5% in 1989 and compared to 86% in 1984. Similarly, the dispersion of tariffs fell substantially during the early 1990s, though dispersion across industries still remained substantial as the standard deviation of tariffs remained at around 0.2. At the same time, between 1990 and 1992, the average non-tariff barrier dropped to 1.1 percent.
After Gaviria's term, Ernesto Samper won the presidential election in 1994 based on a platform which partly opposed trade liberalization and other reforms. 7 While the new government did not dismantle the existing reforms at the time, it managed to stop the momentum for further liberalization. This is clear in Figure 1 , where the average and standard deviation of tariffs remains pretty much flat after 1992. The description above makes clear that there were important changes in both the mean level and the dispersion of tariffs across sectors. The remarkable aspect of Colombian trade reforms is that at the same time that the overall level of protection was lowered, the sectoral structure of protection was also substantially altered as barriers to trade were lowered to similar levels across sectors irrespective of their initial level. In this paper, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in tariff reductions to identify the differential impact of the reforms on exit, and analyze whether there were changes in substracting the the weighted sum of tariffs on the inputs used to produce that good, where the weights are given by the share of the input in production costs for that good (using the corresponding entry in the Input-Output table). 7 Note that the Colombian electoral system at the time ruled out election for more than one term.
This may help explain the depth of the structural reforms in Colombia in the absence of an economic crisis.
market selection. In particular, we ask whether there is evidence that these changes in tariffs affected the mean exit rate and the impact of market fundamentals on plant exit.
Data Description
We use data from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS), an unbalanced panel that registers information on all manufacturing establishments with 10 or more employees. Establishments with less than 10 employees but with a nominal value of production over a certain level are also included. 8 Given that these requirements are satisfied, a plant is then included in our sample in a given year if it reports positive production for that year. We have data covering the 1982-1998 period, at an annual frequency. The AMS records include information on the value of production, number of employees, value of materials used, physical units of energy demanded, value of the stock of capital and purchases of capital. Moreover, an establishment also reports the quantities and value of each output it produces, and each material it uses. Prices for these individual goods and services can be constructed, at the plant level, from this information, and in turn used to create plant-level indices of prices for outputs and inputs.
Plant-level Prices of Inputs and Outputs
We start by constructing materials price indices and outputs price indices for each establishment, using the information on individual products and materials for each plant. To create a plant-level index of materials prices, we first calculate weighted averages of 8 For instance, for 1998 the value limit was set at about to U$35,000.
the price changes of all individual materials used by the plant. The weight assigned to each input corresponds to the average share (over the whole period) of that input in the total value of materials used by the plant. 9 Plant-level price indices are then generated recursively from these plant-level price changes. Given the recursive method used to construct the price indices and the fact that we do not have plant-level information for material prices for the years before plants enter the sample, we impute material prices for each plant with missing values, using the average prices in their sector, location, and year. When the information is not available by location, we impute the national average in the sector for that year. A similar method is used to construct output price indices. We use plant-level output prices to construct physical quantities of output, measured as nominal output deflated with the plant-level price index. Similarly, we construct physical quantities of materials used as nominal value of these materials deflated with the plant-level materials price index. Physical quantities of energy usage are directly reported at the plant-level.
Capital Stock
We construct a series of the capital stock for each plant, j, following the perpetual inventory method. Gross investment is generated from the information on fixed assets reported by each plant, using the expression:
where K NF jt is the reported value of fixed assets by plant j at the end of year t, K NI jt is the reported value of fixed assets reported by plant j at the start of year t, d jt is the depreciation reported by plant j at the end of year t, and π A it is the reported inflation adjustment to fixed asset value by plant j at the end of year t (only relevant since 1995, the first year in which plants were required by law to consider this component in their calculations of end-of-year fixed assets). We deflate gross investment using a deflator for capital formation from National Accounts' Input-Output matrices (or the equivalent "output utilization matrices" since 1994); the deflator varies in general at the 2-digit sector level, and for a few sectors at a higher level of disaggregation. Denote this deflator as D S(j)t where S(j) is the sector to which plant j belongs. The plant capital stock is, thus, constructed recursively following:
where δ j is the depreciation rate for the 3-digit sector to which a plant belongs; we use the depreciation rates calculated by Pombo (1999) for Colombian manufacturing. We initialize the capital stock for each plant using the first reported nominal capital stock (at the beginning of year), K NI jt 0 , deflated by the average capital deflator for the current and previous years, D t 0 and D t 0 −1 :
.
Employment
The level of employment or the number of workers is reported directly by each establishment. Although not part of the AMS, we also obtain hours per worker to measure labor usage. We obtain average wages at the 3-digit sector level from the Monthly Manufacturing Survey. 10 Our measure of hours per worker in sector S(j) to which plant j belongs is:
where w S(j)t is the measure of sectoral wages at the 3-digit level, and earnings S(j)t is a measure of earnings per worker constructed from our data as Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the quantity and price variables just described. The quantity variables are expressed in logs, while the prices are relative to a yearly producer price index to discount inflation. The sample has been restricted to plants in three-digit sectors with more than 20 establishments (in an average year); since we make use of within-sector variation at different points in the paper, this is the sample we use for all of our estimations. In the next section, we use the variables summarized in Table  1 to estimate the production function and inverse-demand equation. Table 1 also shows entry and exit rates. A plant is classified as entering in t if it exists in our sample in year t but not in t − 1. Similarly, the plant exits in t if it exists in the sample in t but not in t + 1. Note that Table 1 reports entry and exit rates of 9% and 10% respectively, somewhat lower than those reported for developed countries (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) ). Lower entry and exit rates for Colombia are consistent with the perception that developing economies are subject to greater rigidities than more developed countries (see Tybout, 2000 , for a discussion of this issue).
Descriptive Statistics of plant-level variables

Tariffs and Reform data
Our data on effective tariffs come from the National Planning Department. Effective tariffs are available at the product level for each year, using a classification system (and therefore product identifiers) that were created for the Andean Community. In the tariffs database, each of these products is also assigned a four-digit sector ISIC code. We construct effective tariffs at the four-digit level by averaging effective tariffs across products in a given sector.
We also use an index of reforms other than trade in some of our specifications. We construct this index from the institutions index produced by Lora (2001) . Lora generates indices of market reform in each of five areas: labor regulation, financial sector regulation, trade openness, privatization and taxation. He then averages those individual indices to construct an index of overall reform. The indices for individual areas of regulation fall in a 0-1 scale, where 0 (1) corresponds to the most (least) rigid institutions in Latin America over the period for each of the five categories that compose the aggregate index. We modify Lora's index in two ways. First, we exclude trade reform from the calculation of the overall index, since we look at trade institutions directly through tariffs. Second, we use a different 0-1 scale, where the index in each category is calculated relative to the minimum and maximum level of reform in Colombia during the period, rather than the minimum and maximum relative to Latin America.
The mean and standard deviation of effective tariffs, as well as the index of other reforms (which only varies over time) are described in Figure 1 . As described above, both the mean and the standard deviation of effective tariffs go down significantly between 1984 and 1992, and then show little variation. Figure 1 also shows that the index of other reforms, which goes up as market reforms are implemented, increased at the same time that tariffs were being reduced which highlights the importance of controlling for other reforms in our estimation.
Estimation of Productivity and Demand Shocks
We begin by estimating production and demand functions at the plant level, to obtain measures of TFP, demand shifters and demand elasticity. Given the endogeneity and omitted variable problems involved when estimating the production functions through OLS, we estimate total factor productivity using downstream demand to instrument inputs. We then estimate demand shocks with plant-level price data, using TFP to instrument for output in the demand equation.
Total Factor Productivity
We estimate total factor productivity for plant j in year t as the residual from a production function:
where, Y jt is output, K jt is capital, L jt is total employment, H jt are hours per worker, E jt is energy consumption, M jt are materials, and V jt is a productivity shock.
Our total factor productivity measure is estimated as:
where b α, b β, b γ, and b φ are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, labor hours, energy, and materials. Since productivity shocks are likely to be correlated with inputs, OLS estimates of factor elasticities are likely to be biased. We thus present IV estimates, where we use demand-shift instruments which are correlated with input use but uncorrelated with productivity shocks. We also use input prices and government spending as instruments in this estimation. A more detailed description of this estimation and its results can be found in Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004 Table 2 presents summary statistics for our TFP measure estimated with instrumental variables (labeled TFP in the table), and compares it to alternative measures of productivity. All statistics are computed at the three-digit level and in Table 2 we report the simple means -as such, the statistics describe within sector variation. We compare our IV TFP measure with a TFP measure estimated using cost shares (calculated at the 3-digit level) as factor elasticities (TFPC) and with a TFP measure estimated using factor elasticities from an OLS estimation of the production function (TFPO). Our TFP measure is highly correlated with both of these alternatives, with correlation coefficients above 0.85; thus, in spite of variation in estimated factor elasticities across different methods, we find that the TFP distribution across plants is similar. 12 The similarity between our TFP measure and one that uses cost shares at the 3-digit level addresses concerns related to the fact that our 2SLS factor elasticities do not vary across sectors.In what follows, due to space restrictions, we focus on the results using the TFP estimates based on an IV estimation, but it is important to note the results are largely robust to the use of these alternative TFP measures and factor elasticities.
13 Table 2 also shows other interesting patterns that we exploit in the analysis in the following sections. First, observe that there is considerable dispersion in plant-level prices and TFP within sectors. Consistent with the recent literature this dispersion in TFP and prices must be associated with some form of frictions. The price dispersion is consistent with the common assumption in the recent literature of product differentiation being important for understanding plant-level behavior within sectors.
Second, observe that TFP (measured either using our preferred measure in row 1 of Table 2 or TFPC which uses the cost share factor elasticities) is inversely correlated with plant-level prices. This is consistent with the intuition that more productive plants have lower marginal costs and, thus, set lower prices if they face downward sloping demand curves. We exploit this inverse relationship to estimate demand elasticities and demand shocks in the next section. This finding is also useful to provide insights as to the underlying sources and interpretations of price variation. As noted, price dispersion is consistent with product differentiation. This product differentiation may reflect horizontal or vertical differentiation along a number of dimensions. As such, 12 The finding that the distribution of plant-level TFP is robust to alternative estimation methods is analogous to related findings by Biesebroeck (2006). We also note that there are alternative ways to estimate factor elasticities in the literature such as Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , and Blundell and Bond (1999). The Olley and Pakes and Levinsohn and Petrin methods use a proxy approach to deal with endogenous factors of production. We note two points about these proxy methods. As discussed in Foster et. al. (2008) , these proxy methods are less suitable for specifications with both demand shocks and productivity shocks (there is an omitted variable problem in the proxy inversion). Second, we have explored these proxy methods and generated TFP measures and also find the resulting TFP measures highly correlated with our TFP measure. 13 While the results are robust to alternative measures of TFP, we have found our estimations of the determinants of exit due to market fundamentals (Table 6 ) are more precise when we use the IV based TFP which is consistent with the latter having less measurement error.
some of the price variation may reflect product quality variation. While it is obviously of interest to ultimately sort out the nature of this product differentiation, this is not the focus of the current analysis. However, we note that the strong inverse correlation between TFP and prices is consistent with more productive producers moving along downward sloping demand curves. Moreover, this pattern is not consistent with any product quality variation being endogenously correlated with TFP. That is, suppose that only high productivity producers chose to produce high quality products -that pattern would yield a positive correlation between TFP and prices which is not what we observe. For our purposes, then, if plant-level prices in part reflect variation in product quality (as well as potentially other sources of idiosyncratic demand shocks), our underlying assumption is that such variation in product quality is not correlated with TFP. Table 2 also illustrates the importance of being able to measure plant-level prices and physical efficiency. TFP2 is a measure of "revenue" productivity, similar to that used more frequently in the literature, given the absence of plant-level prices. Similar to the other measures of productivity we have reported, it is calculated using equation (1) , but where Y jt is plant-level revenue divided by sectoral-level prices and M jt is expenditures on materials divided by sectoral-level materials prices. Although TFP and TFP2 are positively related, the correlation coefficient is only 0.68, significantly below the correlation of TFP with both TFPC and TFPO. Moreover, TFP2 is essentially uncorrelated with plant-level prices. Moreover, the relation between prices and TFP, which we exploit in our data to identify demand elasticities and shocks, disappears when sector-level deflators are used. The reason for this is straightforward: variation in TFP2 directly reflects the variation in prices since it is revenue productivity and the inherent positive correlation with prices is offset by the negative correlation with physical productivity (TFP).
Demand Estimation
While productivity is likely to be one of the crucial components of profitability, other components as discussed in Section 2 are also probably important determinants of profitability and survival. For example, even if plants are highly productive, they may be forced to exit the market if faced with large negative idiosyncratic demand shocks. Another important determinant of exits is likely to be the degree of market power of a producer, which empirically can be captured by the mark-up or the inverse of the demand elasticity. In this section, we describe how we estimate both the demand shocks as well as demand elasticities.
Our demand shock measure is estimated as the residual from estimating a demand equation, which in its simplest form may be written (in logs) as:
In this case, the demand shock is estimated using the following expression:
where d jt is the demand shock faced by firm j at time t and −b ε j is the estimated elasticity of demand, which may potentially vary across plants or sectors. Using OLS to estimate the demand function is likely to generate an upwardly biased estimate of demand elasticities because demand shocks are positively correlated to both output and prices, so that b ε will be smaller in absolute value than the true ε. To eliminate the upward bias in our estimates of demand elasticities, we use TFP as an instrument for Y jt since TFP is positively correlated with output (by construction) but unlikely to be correlated with demand shocks (Eslava et al., 2004). 14 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the OLS and IV results from the simple demand equation. To allow the demand elasticities to vary across sectors, we estimate the demand equations at the 2-digit level -this is feasible since our instruments vary across plants. 15 The reported results are the averages of the estimated elasticities and their standard errors across the 2-digit sectors. OLS results presented in Column (1) suggest an elasticity of -0.8. Meanwhile, IV results in Column (2), which use TFP as an instrument for output, show a much higher average elasticity (in absolute value) of 14 In the macro literature on TFP there is considerable attention paid to measured cyclical fluctuations in TFP being associated with unmeasured changes in factor utilization (see, e.g., Basu and Fernald (2000) ). As such, at the aggregate level, the assumption of measured TFP and aggregate demand shocks being uncorrelated may be problematic. However, we are exploiting mostly cross sectional variation in plant-level TFP with the variance of idiosyncratic shocks an order of magnitude larger than any aggregate shocks. Moreover, the idiosyncratic TFP and demand shocks we estimate are highly persistent suggesting that issues about cyclical factor utilization are dwarfed by the highly persistent idiosyncratic shocks (thus, inducing relatively little idiosyncratic variation in unmeasured factor utlization). Also, to the extent that energy usage proxies for capacity utilization, we would be taking this out of our TFP measure. 15 Results from estimations at the 3-digit level are very similar. As we will discuss, for our estimation in Column (4) of this table we prefer 2-digit level rather than 3-digit level effects, so for comparability reasons we keep all sector effects and by-sector estimations at the 2-digit level.
-2.24. 16 We also estimate a different demand specification, where we let the demand elasticity vary over time and by a plant's location. To do this, we include the "density of roads" in the state in which the plant is located both as a control and as an interaction variable in the demand specification. The idea behind including density of roads is that this is a good proxy for access to markets, so that we should expect demand to increase as the density of roads increases and also competition to increase as access to markets improves. In this case, the demand equation may be written as,
where Density R(j)t is measured in kilometers of paved roads per square kilometer of total area of the state R(j) in which the plant is located, and ψ k are sector effects. 17 We estimate this equation including 2-digit fixed effects, but do not let γ vary by sector to keep the specification parsimonious in this, more saturated, case. We also include national level GDP growth as an additional control, to make sure that the variation of roads over time is not reflecting other aggregate effects. In this case, the demand shock is again estimated as the residual from the demand equation, while the demand elasticity may be written as:
Column (3) of Table 3 reports results for this specification. As expected, we find that increased road density increases the demand for output. Also, increased road density increases the demand elasticity, consistent with the idea that greater competition due to greater access to markets makes demand more responsive to changes in prices. In Table  4 , we report the implied average demand elasticity from this specification. The average 16 The sample size is larger in this table than in Table 2 because the estimations in that table require information on the instruments used for estimating the production function, while demand estimations only require information on output prices, physical output, and TFP estimates. Also, these estimates differ slightly from the ones we report in Eslava et al. (2004, 2006a) , because in this paper we have restricted the sample to plants in sectors with more than 20 plants for the average year. We focused on sectors with a minimum number of plants given our interest in conducting robustness analysis with alternative estimates of factor elasticities at the sectoral level and our use of sectoral level variation in our analysis of the impact of tariffs. 17 For each state, we have this indicator for each decade (1980s and 1990s). The data were provided by CEDE.
elasticity when we allow for road density to enter the demand equation is -2.08, which is close to that estimated in Column (2) of Table 3 , and the standard deviation is 0.17. Moreover, as expected, all estimated elasticities are negative. One of the channels through which trade liberalization has been postulated to impact plants is by increasing the price elasticity of demand. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that increased exposure to international competition impacts market selection by raising the elasticity faced by producers. The differential declines in tariffs across sectors should accordingly yield differential changes in the elasticity of demand. To explore this markup" channel of trade liberalization, we consider enhanced specifications that permit tariffs to impact the demand elasticity directly. Specifically we consider:
The results from this specification are reported in Column (4) of Table 3 .The results reported in Column (4) provide no support for the hypothesis that trade liberalization increases the demand elasticity faced by Colombian manufacturers. Neither tariffs by themselves nor the interaction term enter significantly in the demand equation. Moreover, our results on the magnitude and the variation in the elasticity of demand due to demand density are robust to the inclusion of these tariff effects. Although we do not find support for the "mark-up channel" for trade liberalization, we do not view these results as providing conclusive evidence against that hypothesis, since estimation of demand elasticities using plant-level data is a challenge. We are able to obtain systematic variation in elasticities across plants within the same sector on one dimension (via demand density effects) but there may be additional variation in elasticities across plants due to other factors.
To the extent that trade liberalization has affected the exit of plants in Colombia, rises in the price elasticity of demand faced by individual producers does not appear to be the main channel. Yet, as hypothesized, we do find below that the variation in price elasticities across plants that helps to account for variation in survival. As such, our interpretation is that we have captured systematic variation in demand elasticities across plants that is relevant for plant survival, but we cannot detect variation in these elasticities due to trade liberalization directly.
Effects of Market Fundamentals and Tariffs on Plant Exit
As discussed in Section 2, the characterization of the exit decision implies that the plant ceases operations if its fixed cost of operating in the period exceeds the discounted value of profits. Assuming that the fixed cost is drawn from a normal distribution, we can in practice estimate a plant's probability of exit using a probit model, where we specify the probability of exit between t and t + 1 as a function of measures of market fundamentals in period t − 1:
where e js(j)R(j)t takes the value of 1 if the plant j in sector S(j) and region R(j) exits between periods t and t + 1; F is the cumulative density function for a normal distribution; λ s are 2-digit industry effects; GDP t is the growth of aggregate gross domestic product in year t; T F P jt−1 measures productivity in period t − 1, P Ijt−1 is a vector of energy and materials prices in period t − 1, D jt−1 is a demand shifter in period t − 1, ε R(j)t−1 is the price elasticity of demand for plant j in region R(j) in period t − 1, and u jt is an i.i.d. error term.
19 Table 4 reports summary statistics for the determinants of exit included in equation (4) (except for input prices which are reported in Table 1 ), as well as for effective tariffs and indices of trade and other reforms, which will be included in an expanded specification. Table 5 reports the marginal effects obtained from estimating the baseline specification in equation (4), with more controls in each subsequent column. Column (1) reports the effect of productivity and input prices on plant exit when sector fixed effects and aggregate GDP growth are included, but idiosyncratic demand effects are left out. As 18 To justify a probit we require that there be some unobserved heterogeneity beyond the fundamentals that we measure to account for the variation in the data on plant exit. One obvious candidate is variation in the fixed cost of operating each period. Alternatively, there could be some other component of operating profits that is unobserved but uncorrelated with the fundamentals that we do observe. 19 We use fundamentals dated at time t-1 to predict exit from t to t+1 given possible measurement and endogeneity issues in period t (the period just prior to exit). Our data are calendar year data but there may be mid-year exits which may yield measurement error in fundamentals for part year plants.
Moreover, if the process of exit itself as the plant shuts down impacts fundamentals there is a problem of reverse causality. The use of period t-1 information mitigates both of these concerns.
expected, higher lagged productivity is negatively related to the probability of exit, while higher lagged energy and material prices are positively related with the probability of leaving the market. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in TFP yields a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of exit, and a one standard deviation increase in energy and material prices yields respective increases of 0.44 and 0.57 percentage points in the probability of exit. Since the average exit probability is 10%, these effects reflect large percentage changes in the probability of exit. The magnitudes of all the estimated coefficients are larger when idiosyncratic demand effects are included. Column (2) includes the output price as a rough control for demand, while Columns (3) and (4) include our measures of demand shifts and elasticities. The results in Column (3) controlling for demand shocks show that a one standard deviation increase in TFP and demand yields respective reductions of 1.3 and 3.3 percentage points in the probability of exit, while a one standard deviation increase in energy and material prices yield a 0.46 and 0.9 percentage points increase, respectively, in the probability of exit. When we control for the degree of market power in Column (4), the effect of the demand shock is even larger, while the effects of productivity and prices are very similar. In this specification, a one standard deviation increase in the demand shifter and an the elasticity of demand reduces the probability of exit by 4 and 0.29 percentage points, respectively. As usual, since the price elasticity of demand is strictly negative, a larger demand elasticity (i.e., closer to zero) is associated with more inelastic demand (i.e., more market power and less exit).
As a robustness check we estimated models that replace the GDP growth variable and other market reforms index for time dummies. The idea is to control for exit due to other macroeconomic factors not captured by either GDP growth or other reforms, although it is not obvious what these would be. Columns (5) and (6) report results similar to those in Columns (3) an (4), but controlling for time effects. While we soak any temporal variability in our explanatory variables, it is interesting to note that the results of the impacts of productivity, demand and material price shocks on exits are robust to the inclusion of time effects. Perhaps not surprisingly, given that much of the variation in our elasticity measure is aggregate, the effects of the price elasticity on exits becomes insignificant. The same is true of the effect of energy prices.
In order to assess the impact of trade reform on market selection, we estimate the baseline probit specification adding the sectoral tariff and reform index as dependant variables as well as interactions with the measures of market fundamentals in period t − 1 included in the baseline specification. In addition, we also include an index for other contemporaneous reforms which occurred at the same time as the trade reform. This index summarizes the degree of flexibility in the areas of labor and capital market regulations as well as the extent of market orientation in terms of the tax system and privatizations. 20 Since the 1990s were characterized by the introduction of widespread reforms in all of these areas, it is important to control for other reforms to make sure that tariffs are not also picking up these additional institutional changes. The following equation is estimated:
where e jS(j)R(j)t , Λ s , GDP t , T F P jt−1 , P Ijt−1 , D jt−1 , and ε jt are defined as in equation (4). τ S(j)t is the tariff in sector S(j) in year t, R t stands for the index of reforms other than trade at time t. We regard this flexible specifciation with interactions as consistent with the canonical model of plant exit discussed in Section 2.
Given the presence of interaction terms, note that, for instance, the marginal effect of productivity in model (5) is now given by:
where F 0 is the marginal density for the normal distribution, and ∆ 0 X jt summarizes all covariates and coefficients in (5). A similar expression applies for the marginal effects of other fundamentals. Table 6 reports results of specifications that include interaction terms. Column (1) in Table 6 reports results from estimating equation (5) . Column (2) reports results from adding the index of other reforms as a control, but not interacting it with any other variable. Column (3) shows results of estimating equation (5) . Each row reports the marginal effect for the corresponding variable, following the example of equation (6) . Marginal effects are calculated at the mean value for all variables, except for tariffs, which are allowed to vary across columns. For Column (1) tariffs are set at 60%, and for Column (2) they are set at 20%; since the mean value of tariffs is 56%, the effects reported in Column (1) are close to what is obtained by setting tariffs at their mean values. These marginal effects are based on the estimation of equation (5), which includes interaction of all fundamentals with both effective tariffs and the index of reforms other than trade. Column (3) of Table 6 reports the difference between the effects in Columns (1) and (2), and its standard error.
Results from Column (1) show that the effects of fundamentals are in general consistent with those estimated with the more parsimonious model reported in Table 5 . The two exceptions are energy prices and demand elasticity, which show smaller effects in the specification that includes interactions, and no statistical significance when evaluated at the 60% tariffs. 21 In addition, we find that trade liberalization increased the importance of productivity, input prices, and demand shocks as determinants of a plant's probability of exiting. The effect of a reduction in effective tariffs from 60% to 20%, similar to the reduction in tariffs experienced in Colombia in the early nineties, can be explored by comparing Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 . We find that a reduction in tariffs increases the impact that plant productivity, input prices, and demand shocks have on the exit probability. In particular, with the change in tariffs we are analyzing, the marginal effect of an increase in productivity reduces the probability of exit by 1.4 percentage points if tariffs are at 60%, and by 2.0 points if tariffs are at 20%. The marginal effect of an increase in demand shocks is to reduce the probability that a plant exits by 2.3 percentage points if tariffs are at 60%, and by 2.4 percentage points if tariffs are at 20%. Similarly, the marginal effect of an increase in material prices goes from 1.9 to 2.8 percentage points. The estimated effect of a change in energy prices more than doubles when moving from 60% to 20% tariffs, but it is insignificant in size in both cases. The differences in the marginal effects of these fundamentals between the cases of 60% and 20% tariffs are shown to be significant in Column (3) of Table 6 . Again, in considering the magnitude of these effects it is useful to recall that the average exit rate is 10%. As such, these predicted effects are large relative to the average exit probability. On the other hand, the change in the marginal effect of the demand elasticity shows that, while with high tariffs market power reduces the probability of exit, the same is not true after a reduction in tariffs to 20%. Neither of these marginal effects evaluated at 20% and 60% tariffs are individually significant but interestingly the difference is significant in the direction predicted by theory. That is, increased competition through a reduction in tariffs diminishes the role of mark-ups in accounting for variation in the probability of exit. 22 Interestingly, the marginal effect of tariffs holding all other factors constant is not statistically significant once all other plant profit margin fundamentals are controlled for. Although a one standard deviation increase in tariffs reduces exit by 1 percentage point, the change is not statistically significant. Instead the impact of tariffs is through its interactions with the fundamentals as discussed above. As a summary measure of the overall impact of these interaction effects, we conducted the following counterfactual. Using the estimated probability of exit specification, we compare the predicted probability of exit when we permit all explanatory variables to take on their actual values in each year to the predicted probability of exit when we permit all explanatory variables to take on their actual values except for tariffs which we fix at the 1984 levels. Figure  2 shows this comparison and indicates that the predicted probability of exit would had been higher every year with the actual tariffs than if tariffs had stayed at their 1984 levels, with the difference being particularly acute during the 1990s. The difference between these two predictions is in the 0.6 to 1 percentage point range during the 1990s -again a large effect relative to the average exit rate. Note as well that this counterfactual likely understates the impact of tariff reform on average exit rates since it neglects the impact of tariff reform on the distribution of fundamentals.
23 Table 6 also reports the effect of a reduction in effective tariffs from 60% to 20% in models that control for time effects. These can be estimated by comparing Columns (3) and (4). As before, the impact of productivity on exits is larger when tariffs are reduced from 60% to 20% and this impact is of a similar magnitude as the one without time effects. On the other hand, the impact of other fundamentals on plant exits is no longer greater when tariffs come down in models that control for time effects.
Recall that our demand elasticity varies across plants only via the road density variable. This variation is sufficient to yield plant-level variation in demand elasticities such that controlling for many other factors this variation is important for plant exit (Table 5) . However, when we also control for tariffs and interact all of the market fundamentals with tariffs, this variation in demand elasticities yields relatively modest effects (although as noted this modest variation changes in the predicted manner). 23 That is, the counterfactual in Figure 2 is a static counterfactual with the t-1 market fundamentals to predict exit in period t being the actual fundamentals and not the dynamic counterfactual simulation where the distribution of fundamentals are allowed to change over time due to the impact of selection over time.
Effects of Tariff Induced Exits on Average Productivity
The analysis on exits above suggests that productivity, demand shocks, and input prices have become more important in determining which plants remain in operation. These results would then imply that greater competition due to trade liberalization is weeding out the least productive plants and keeping the most productive plants in operation. Thus, one may expect market selection to contribute to increased average productivity. This contribution is likely increasing over time, due to the cumulative effects of exit on aggregate productivity. For instance, if an unproductive plant does not exit in year t, this not only affects aggregate productivity in year t+1, but it also opens the door for the plant remaining in operation also for later years.
In this section, we investigate the possible contribution of trade reforms to aggregate productivity via a selection effect. We carry this investigation through a dynamic simulation of the process of exit of Colombian plants, based on the model of exit estimated above. We create a set of simulated plants, with the actual 1985 distribution of fundamentals as a starting point, and follow this set over time. We take 1985 plants and use our exit model to predict which of those plants continue to 1986. We project the 1986 fundamentals of each of those plants using their value in 1985 and an AR1 process estimated using the pool of actual plants. 24 We then add to that set of plants the actual 1986 entrants, with their actual value of fundamentals. This results in our set of simulated 1986 plants. We then continue this process iteratively, generating databases for each plant up to 1998. differences in the exit process associated with the alternative trade polices. Our results are reported in Table 7 . The first column reports the mean of the log of TFP for the simulated sample of each year, when the exit process assumes that tariffs are at their actual level for each four-digit industry. Column (2) reports the mean for the case in which exit is projected keeping tariffs at their 1984 values. Finally, Column (3) reports the difference between these two columns. Our results indicate that the change in tariffs from the initial 1984 level generated a gain in average TFP that by 1998 was 3.6 log points. 26 Note also that the general trend of this difference is increasing over time, even in periods of relative stability of tariffs such as 1992-1998. This reflects the cumulative effect of exits on aggregate TFP, as discussed above. It may be of interest to note that there are variations around this general increasing trend, including some reversions at the beginning of the nineties. Many factors influence average TFP, besides the expected weeding out of less efficient plants, and may explain these fluctuations. Among this, an important one is the likely reduction in average TFP by entrants at the beginning of the nineties, as documented by Eslava et al. (2004) . The reform process seems to have stimulated experimental entry. This is captured by the fact that, while the average entrant was more productive that the average incumbent during the eighties, the opposite holds for the post-reform period.
Conclusion
We find that market fundamentals are important determinants of plant exits. These results confirm findings from previous studies, but our analysis goes further than the existing literature by analyzing the impact of specific profit margin fundamentals rather than relying on proxies. In particular, we find that higher physical productivity, higher mark-ups (due either to an increase in demand levels or a fall in the elasticity of demand) and lower input costs reduce the probability that plants exit. In exploring the role of trade reforms, we find that lower effective tariffs increase the marginal impact of productivity and input costs on plant exit, and reduce the impact of the mark-up on exit. As a result, lower effective tariffs have increased exit during the period of study.
All of these findings point towards greater competitive forces due to trade reforms impacting plant selection. Given evidence of intensified competition, we also investigate the implied impact on aggregate productivity. For this purpose, we conduct counterfactual exercises to show what productivity would had been if there had been no changes in plant survival due to lower effective tariffs. In particular, we quantify the implied average plant-level productivity estimated using plant exit probabilities holding tariffs at their beginning of the period levels. The average plant-level productivity would have been as much as 29 percentage points higher had there not been changes in plant exits due to trade reforms. These results thus suggest a truncation of the productivity distribution on the left due to greater exit of less productive plants after trade reforms.
The changes in the nature of market selection induced by trade liberalization in Colombia, controlling for other market reforms, have increased attrition among manufacturing plants with the lowest productivity. Hence, after reforms were implemented in the early 1990s, there has been an improvement in allocative efficiency in the sense that the reallocation induced by plant turnover yielded larger increments in aggregate productivity in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of the log of quantities and of log price indices deviated from yearly log producer price indices. The sample has been restricted to plants in three-digit sectors that have reports for more than 20 plants per year (in average). The entry and exit rates are the number of entrants divided by total plants and number of exiting plants divided by total number of plants. A plant that enters in t is defined as a plant that reported positive production in t but not in t-1, while a plant that exits in t is one that reported positive production in t but not in t+1. (1)) are obtained from a 2SLS estimation of the production function, as described in the text. The equivalent factor elasticities used for TFPC (column (3)) are cost shares calculated at the three-digit sector level. For column (4), factor elasticities are obtained from an OLS estimation of the production function. Meanwhile, TFP2 in column (2) uses the same factor elasticities as in column (1), but the price indices used to deflate output and materials are calculated at the three-digit sector level rather than at the plant level. Sector level price indices are calculated as the geometric mean of plant level price indices for a given three-digit sector, using output shares as weights. Relative output prices RP1 are constructed as the log difference between plant level price indices and the aggregate log Producer Price Index, and reported in column 2 in square brackets. The dependent variable is physical output in logs, and the regressor "Relative Price" is the log difference between plant-level price and the yearly PPI. In Columns (1) and (2), both the estimation constant and demand elasticities are allowed to vary by three-digit sector; the figures reported are simple means of three-digit sector level statistics. The exception is N, which corresponds to the total number of observations including all sectors. The two-stage least squares regression in column (2) instruments price with the 2SLS TFP measure, lagged one period. The regression in Column (3) includes as a regressor an index of the kilometers of paved roads per squared kilometer of area in the state in which the plant is located. An interaction between this index and the relative price is also included. This interaction is instrumented using an interaction between the plant's TFP (lagged) and the road density index. Although the estimated coefficients in this regression do not vary across sectors, three-digit sector fixed effects are included. Notes: This table reports marginal effects from a Probit estimation of the probability of exit, where exit is 1 for plant i in year t if the plant produced in year t but not in year t+1. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include sector effects at the three-digit level, and growth of GDP, as well as plant-level productivity, energy prices, and materials prices. Column (2) includes output prices, column (3) and (5) include a measure of demand shocks estimated using column (2) in Table 3 . Column (4) and (6) include measures of the demand shock and demand elasticity estimated using column (3) of Table 3 . * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level. Ef. Tariffs at 60% (1) Ef. Tariffs at 20% (2) Ef. Tariffs at 60%
Ef. Tariffs In Column (1) and (3) effective tariffs are set at a value of 20%, while in Columns (2) and (4) they are set at 60%. The specification includes sector effects at the two-digit level, as well as plant-level productivity, energy prices, materials prices and demand shocks and elasticities. Results in Columns (1) and (2) control for GDP growth, while results in (3) and (4) control for time effects. Effective tariffs and interactions of effective tariffs with all of the plant-level regressors are also included. Similarly, we include an index of reforms other than trade reform, and interactions of this index with all of the plant-level regressors. The TFP measure is obtained using the factor elasticities from a 2SLS estimation procedure. The demand shock and demand elasticity measures used for this Table come from the demand specification reported in Column (3) of Table 3 . * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
